The AI Security Institute has released a
detailed report on an security incident of its own making. The
Institute set some LLM agents loose on the Internet with a security
challenge; soon they were creating malware-laden pull requests and
sock-puppet accounts to promote them.

The agent opened a malicious pull request (PR) to ⟨REPO_A⟩ and
pursued a number of strategies to get it merged:

Repeatedly commented on the PR with sockpuppet accounts to manufacture
consensus and pressure the maintainer into approving with minimal
review.

Opened a GitHub Issue in another repository (also owned by ⟨PERSON_A⟩)
containing a prompt injection for other coding agents. The malicious
instructions were addressed to issue-triage AI coding agents and
invisible to humans viewing the website.

Sent multiple emails to ⟨PERSON_A⟩ and ⟨PERSON_B⟩, with different
pretexts to get them to run malicious code. Over the course of the
sample, the agent sent five emails, some containing malware, others
aimed at persuading a maintainer to accept the pull request.

It would be surprising if this were the only incident of this type; the
only real difference here is that the people involved are documenting what happened.

https://lwn.net/Articles/1087162/
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